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Abstract—Vehicular ad hoc networking (VANET) have become a 
significant technology in the current years because of the 
emerging generation of self-driving cars such as Google driverless 
cars. VANET have more vulnerabilities compared to other 
networks such as wired networks, because these networks are an 
autonomous collection of mobile vehicles and there is no fixed 
security infrastructure, no high dynamic topology and the open 
wireless medium makes them more vulnerable to attacks. It is 
important to design new approaches and mechanisms to rise the 
security these networks and protect them from attacks. In this 
paper, we design an intrusion detection mechanism for the 
VANETs using Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) to detect 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The main role of IDS is to detect 
the attack using a data generated from the network behavior such 
as a trace file. The IDSs use the features extracted from the trace 
file as auditable data. In this paper, we propose anomaly and 
misuse detection to detect the malicious attack.  
Keywords—security; vehicular ad hoc networks; intrusion detection 
system; driverless car.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
       A vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a self-configuring 
and self- adaptive network of wireless links that connect mobile 
vehicles. It is a group of wireless mobile vehicles that 
cooperate by sending or receiving packets of data, to or from 
each other’s nodes allowing them to communicate beyond the 
direct wireless transmission possible in the individual vehicle 
radio range [1]. Each vehicle in the vehicular ad hoc network 
can act as a router or a host [1]. The VANETs allow vehicles 
to communicate directly with each other (V2V), stations (V2I) 
and roadside units (RSUs) in the absence of a fixed 
infrastructure [2]. VANETs can be used on Intelligent 
Transportation System (ITS) to ensure the safety and comfort 
for road users [3]. The main objective of VANETs is to protect 
the passengers, drivers and the vehicle itself. These networks 
provide security and achieve their goals by exchanging 
cooperative awareness messages (CAMs) [4]. Furthermore, 
these networks play a main and vital role in self-driving cars 
because they eliminate time and space constraints and make 
information available to the vehicle when required. However, 
certain characteristics of these networks have resulted in 
vulnerabilities at all levels. These characteristics are: the open 
wireless medium, the highly dynamic network topology and 
the absence of traditional security infrastructure [5]. In 
addition, there are other concerns which have increased their 
vulnerability, namely the routing mechanism and the auto-
configuration [5]. VANETs have unique features that 
distinguish them from conventional networks, such as high-
speed, mobility and density of vehicles on the road. These 
features make procuring network security a challenging and 
threat prone task [1].   
A new generation of vehicles being researched are called 
self-driving vehicles. These vehicles are considered a 
revolution in the automotive industry as these vehicles did not 
officially appear as vehicles in markets until recently. Vehicle 
manufacturers used to collaborate with communication 
companies before the advent of self-driving vehicles. Vehicles 
have started being equipped with communication devices On 
Board Units (OBU), which consist of omni directional 
antennas, at least one processor, a Global Position System 
(GPS), and an array of sensors for V2V and V2I 
communications [6]. In addition, these devices are able to 
generate emergency messages such messages to notify of 
emergent braking, traffic jams or accidents. These early 
messages send to the vehicles enable them to avoid congestion 
and accidents through detours or changing lanes. Figure 1 
shows RSUs, vehicles and the occurrence of an accident. Once 
an accident has occurred, CAMs are generated and 
communicated to the RSUs and other vehicles in that zone.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. An example of the process of responding to cases of emergency on the 
road 
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from potential attacks. The main motivation for this security 
system is the real-time detection of malicious vehicles in the 
VANET’s environment. The intelligent intrusion detection 
system (IDS) has the ability to detect abnormal or malicious 
behavior and isolate a malicious vehicle from communicating 
with the system. The detection system relies only on data 
collected from the network in the form of a trace file.  
This paper is organized in the following way: Section II 
explores related work in the research area of attacks on 
VANETs. Section III describes the methodology  and section 
IV explains the experimental results. Section V shows the 
dissection. Section VI is conclusions and future work. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
VANETs face many security problems in the 
communication system. The role of the security system is 
collecting traffic data from the VANETs, analyzing it, and then 
detecting and predicting any abnormal behavior in the network.  
VANETs provide critical information for emergency real-
time applications, therefore, security and privacy become a very 
important issue. The VANETs enable self-driving and semi 
self-driving vehicles to avoid or reduce problems such as 
drivers’ error by either making desired decisions or by sending 
CAMs to other vehicles, one of the most significant 
requirements for VANETs is security.  
VANETs face many types of attacks, we have chosen to 
focus on the attack. As we know, self-driving vehicles rely 
heavily on communication with their external environment in 
order to make decisions. DoS attacks can have two different 
objectives [7]: 
1) Control of a vehicles’ resources. 
2) Jamming the communication channels. 
In this case, we can infer that the DoS attacks have direct 
negative impact on the life of passengers and on the vehicles 
themselves, when it prevents the arrival of warning messages 
from and to other vehicles [8]. Therefore, they are internal or 
external attacks that have a direct impact on the network by 
denying users the available resources [9]. The main motivation 
of selecting the DoS attack is that it can be launched against 
any layer in the network [10] and is therefore a high priority to 
defend against. 
Yan et al. proposed a novel solution to this security problem, 
namely; a combinatorial approach to collect data from three 
different resources: radar detection, traffic and neighboring 
data. Thus, the system computed the similarity between these 
data [11]. Liu et al. designed a system to secure the 
communications system for the vehicles depending on roadside 
units. Their infrastructure contained a Certification Authority 
(CA) based cluster distributed in different regions. The aim 
was to show that IDS using a CA database provided more 
protection against malicious vehicles with legal certificates 
[12]. Al-Mutaz et al. presented a new protocol for the detection 
of Sybil attacks in vehicular networks. The proposed technique 
was based on reports periodically collected by the road side 
units regarding the status of their physical neighborhood. This 
new technology was based on the platoon model, through 
which the protocol could identify abnormal vehicle behaviors. 
The platoon is considered one of the features generated by the 
vehicles through their communication across networks. This 
takes place through periodic messages, which the attacker tries 
to jam. It is this jamming that affects the vehicles’ ability to 
achieve the platoon [13]. Lyamin et al., proposed an algorithm 
for detecting denial of service attacks in real-time based on 
some performance metrics such as the percentage of false 
alarms for any jamming channel and the average beacon time 
for vehicular ad hoc networks [14]. Lakshmi et al., focused on 
the importance of protecting VANETs by isolating malicious 
vehicles that were designed to damage the performance of the 
network. To identify a malicious vehicle they measure the 
performance of the network in terms of a packet's delivery 
ratio, dropped packets, the average end-to-end delay and 
routing overhead. [15]. Thajeal, discussed the vulnerabilities in 
ad hoc wireless networks, and described an IDS using ANN. 
Researchers have shown the possibility of the application of 
cooperative statistical anomaly detection models to protect 
against attacks on routing protocols, on wireless MAC 
protocols or on wireless applications and services [16]. Singh 
et al., proposed a detection system to detect malicious nodes 
based on data mining in MANETs. The security system uses 
three stages: collect the dataset, analysis and detection. The 
core of detection was based on the data extracted from the 
trace file that was generated by using Network Simulation 
version 2 (NS2) [17].  
 There are two types of IDSs, misuse and anomaly detection 
systems [18]. Anomaly detection systems are based on the 
normal behavior of a subject and any action that significantly 
deviates from the normal behavior is considered intrusive. 
However, this type of systems has a high positive detection 
error, difficulty handling gradual misbehavior and expensive 
computation. The misuse detection systems are based on the 
characteristics of known attacks or system vulnerabilities, 
which makes them highly effective, but they cannot detect 
novel types of attacks. In our research, we propose a system 
that uses both types of IDSs 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In this paper, we propose a security system for external 
communication for self-driving and semi-self-driving vehicles 
that depends on intelligent IDS. The security system is based on 
data collected from the network. The steps below explain the 
methodology: 
A. Mobility model  
 We used two tools to generate a real-world traffic of 
normal and malicious behavior and mobility models for 
vehicle's ad hoc networks. These tools are Simulation of Urban 
Mobility Model (SUMO) and MObilty VEhicles (MOVE) [19]. 
MOVE is designed on SUMO. The output file of these tools is 
a mobility file for the vehicles that is an image of the real 
world; these files are used as input to NS2 [20]. The files of the 
map (file name.net.xml) and route (file name.rou.xml) were 
used to produce SUMO trace files (file name.sumo.tr) that were 
then imported to MOVE and converted to the NS2 format for 
the VANETs’ analysis. Generally, mobility models are divided 
 
 
into two types: urban mobility models and highway mobility 
models [21]. The urban mobility model includes many types of 
models such as the Random Way Point (RWM) model, 
Manhattan mobility model and Rice University Model (RUM). 
In this paper, we use the Manhattan model because it allows 
vehicles to move in vertical or horizontal direction. Another 
reason for the use of this model is widely used in the research 
field [21].  
B.  Simulation environment 
We created a VANET’s environment on the NS2 simulator 
as shown in figure 2 and selected one of the vehicles as a 
malicious vehicle. The NS2 is designed to simulate different 
networks such as wired and wireless networks [22]. However, 
we face a problem in simulating the VANETs with NS2 
because the simulator is not designed specifically for VANETs. 
In this case, we need extra tools to achieve the simulation: 
SUMO, MOVE and City Mob (generate mobility model) [23]. 
We use the network simulation version 2 (NS2.35) [22] and 
mobility system to achieve the IDS for VANETs in the real 
world.  
A screenshot of NS-2 utilizing Network the Animator 
(NAM) trace file is shown in figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Screenshot of Simulation in NS-2 NAM 
 
One of the important issues in the simulation system is the 
initial parameters. They specify the performance and the 
behavior in NS2. Some parameters used in simulating the 
VANETs are: Constant Bit Rate (CBR) application that sends 
constant packets through the transport protocol such as (UDP), 
Radio Propagation Model (Two Ray Ground) in table 1 [22]. 
              
                 Table 1 Simulator Environmental and Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Simulation time 250s 
Number of nodes 30 Vehicles 
Number of RSUs 6 RSUs 
Type of Traffic Constant Bit Rate (CBR) 
Topology 600 x 400 (m) 
Transport Protocol UDP 
Packet Size 512 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Channel type Wireless 
Queue Length 50 packets 
Number of Road Lanes 2 
Radio Propagation Model Two Ray Ground 
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11 
Speed 50 m/s 
Interface queue type Priority Queue 
Network Interface type Physical Wireless 
Mobility Models Manhattan Mobility Model 
 
C. Malicious behavior  
To measure and evaluate the performance of IDSs, we need 
to generate two types of behavior: normal and malicious. A 
vehicle is called malicious when it drops the packets. The 
malicious behavior is created in NS2 using the Tools Command 
Language (TCL) script and the database extracted from the 
trace file. In this case, we need to modify some files of the 
routing protocol to generate the abnormal behavior (select 
which vehicles are to drop packets rather than forward them to 
the a destination vehicle).  In our work, we add a malicious 
vehicle to the AODV routing protocol. Because of the change 
in behavior, the trace file generated from the malicious vehicles 
has different characteristics than the  trace file generated from 
the normal behavior.  
The VANETs environment consists of 30 vehicles and 6 
RSUs on an NS2 simulator [22]. We create one malicious 
vehicle in our scenario.  
D. Feature sets 
The IDS relies on features that describe the events in the 
VANET. We can extract behavior from the trace file as it 
contains many different data (features) that can be used for 
analysis. These features describe normal and abnormal or 
malicious behavior. 
A trace file is used to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed IDS. Trace files capture the events of the network that 
can be used for performance evaluation, e.g. the amount of 
packets transferred between two vehicles, the delay in the 
transfer of the packets, packet drop. In this case, the type and 
the number of the features are very important for IDS. In our 
research, we train and test the IDS with all features of trace file 
that describe the normal and malicious behavior.  
 
 
Train 
Data 
Optimal 
Non- optimal  
First 
Phase  
Third  
Phase 
Second 
Phase 
Data Collection 
We can get five types of events feature from a trace file, 
these events are: send (s), receive (r), drop (D), forward (f) 
extracted and movement (M) [23]. The trace file is divided into 
three parts that are “basic trace”, “IP trace” and “AODV trace” 
information. It contains twenty five fields which are shown in 
the below table 2 [23]. 
  
                            Table 2 features of trace file 
Basic Trace IP Trace AODV Trace 
Event, Time, Trace 
level, Node Number, 
Packet ID, Payload 
Size and Type, 
Delay, Source and 
Destination MAC, 
and IP Packet 
IP Source and 
Destination, Port 
Source and 
Destination, Time 
to Live and next 
Hope Node 
Packet Tagged, 
Hope Counts, 
Broadcast ID, 
Destinatio IP with 
Sequence number, 
Source IP with 
Sequence number 
and Label of Record 
 
E. Intelligent detection system 
The intelligent detection system uses an ANN to identify 
malicious vehicles in VANETs. Current studies in the field of 
self-driving vehicles, confirm that ANN (Feed Forward) is the 
most efficient and convenient in design of internal and external 
systems for these vehicles [24]. The IDS (more than 32000 
records) describe the behavior on the network whether normal 
or malicious. The dataset is divided into different groups, also it 
is again divided into three subsets, the first subset is the training 
set (50%), the second subset is the validation set (25%) and the 
third subset test set (25%). 
The network training ends when the least-square-error E 
between the desired  and actual output		   is less than Emax 
or when the number of sweeps equal 500, we define 
		
∗
 . For all experiments, the learning rate  was 
fixed to 1*10
-6
 for each training yielding difference, of which 
the best result is selected.  
In our research, we used trial-and-error attempts to 
configure the best ratio of training depending on the condition 
put on the second phase of the proposal. Table 3 shows some of 
the configuration parameters used in the ANN. 
                        Table 3 ANN Parameters 
Parameter Value 
TrainParam. epochs 68 
TrainParam.lr 1*10-5 
TrainParam. goal 0 
TrainParam. min_grad 1*10-14 
We design the simulation on system with an Intel core i3 
processor (2.53GHZ) and RAM memory (4GB). 
 
F. The Proposed Model of IDS    
The ANN used in this paper consists of three layers, an 
input, a hidden, and an output layer. An input layer consists of 
25 neurons equal to the number of features in the features 
vector. The hidden layer consists of 5 neurons which the 
output layer consists of 3 neurons.  
The proposed system has three stages, figure 3 shows the 
overall architecture of the proposed IDS, namely: 
• The first stage (Data collection and Pre-processing)- The 
normal and malicious behavior for vehicles is built into 
the NS2, and a dataset is generated from the trace file. We 
extract the features from the data in the trace file. The 
features are preprocessed using normalization, 
transformation and uniform distribution.  
• The second stage (Training)- In this we train the ANN 
with the extracted dataset (features). 
• The third stage (Testing)- In this step, we test ANN with 
data features that describe malicious and normal behavior. 
After the trained ANN is stable, it can surveil the 
VANETs security by identifying the network control 
messages and data packets in real time and generating an 
alarm immediately if there is malicious behavior. 
The malicious vehicles can perform many types of attacks 
such as DoS attacks [25] and we build a detection system for 
detecting the DoS attack. We detect the DoS attack by its 
behavior, such as flooding and dropping packets [26].  
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The anomaly and misuse detection methods are based on 
an ANN that can learn the normal or abnormal behavior 
through the iterative process. The main reason for using the 
ANN is to reduce the cost, achieve real-time responsiveness 
and to be efficient [18].  
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The detection system may be installed in three 
configurations: vehicles, RSU or both on the vehicles and RSU. 
In our study, we selected to install the detection system in 
vehicles. The security system can identify among two different 
behaviors: normal or abnormal/ malicious through IDS. In this 
section, we show the performance of the detection system. 
Detection accuracy is used as a performance metric to evaluate 
the IDS. 
To measure and evaluate the performance of IDSs, we 
need to calculate four: True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), 
True Negative (TN) and False Negative (FN). The accuracy of 
the system result should be calculated as follows [27]:  
 
 =
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In addition, the measures will be calculated as follows 
[45]: Let  
"& =≠ !	!!!				!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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(	 
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A. Result of Training and Testing Neural Network with 
(Misuse Detection) 
During the training and testing phase, we used the same 
dataset in both phases (signature), to calculate the total 
accuracy, true positive, false positive, true negative, false 
negative. Total accuracy of train = 98.97  
The performance of classification and number of records 
used in the proposed system is shown in table 4.  
 
                       Table 4 Accuracy of Classification 
Attack 
Class 
                             IDS 
 Real 
Record 
ANN 
Match 
Records 
Miss 
Records 
Accuracy 
Normal 14533 14404 14379 25 98.94% 
Abnormal 2868 2997 2843 154 99.12% 
Unknown 0 0 0 0 NaN 
 
The rates are calculated by equations (2,3,4 and 5) as shown 
table 5. 
 
                           Table 5 Recognition Rate 
Alarm Type Accuracy 
True positive 99.82% 
True negative 94.86% 
False negative 0.17% 
False positive 5.13% 
 
B. Result of Training and Testing Neural Network 
(Anomaly Detection) 
During the training and testing phase, the data set used in 
the testing phase differs from the data set used in the training 
phase (anomaly). We calculate the total accuracy to evaluate 
the performance of the IDS. In this case, the IDS must be able 
to detect novel attacks, the  performance of classification and 
number of records used in the proposed system is shown in 
table 6: 
Table 6 Accuracy of Classification 
Attack 
Class 
                          
IDS 
   
 Real 
Record 
ANN Match 
Records 
Miss 
Records 
Accuracy 
Normal 28676 28790 28234 556 98.45% 
Abnormal 3725 3609 3167 442 85.02% 
Unknown 0 2 0 2 NaN 
 
The rates are calculated by equations (2,3,4 and 5) as shown 
table 7. 
                           Table 7 Recognition Rate 
Alarm Type Accuracy 
True positive 98.06% 
True negative 87.75% 
False negative 1.93% 
False positive 12.248% 
  
V. DISCUSSION 
The main motivation of the proposed system is to 
implement a secure communication of self-driving cars by 
identifying malicious cars in VANETs. This system is 
implemented via three phases: data collection and pre-
processing phase, training phase and testing phase. 
This approach is characterized in that it integrates different 
techniques to get the best results in addition that a comparison 
with the expected theoretical results to ensure the effectiveness 
of the system. 
Our experiments in NS2 show that the detection system is 
effective and efficient for identifying anomalies with a low 
false negative alarm rate, the error rate is 2.05%. The obtained 
results indicated that the calculated rate of alarms fluctuated 
between 94.86 and 99.82, which deal with good efficient 
accuracy. On the other hand, the anomaly detection system has 
a low false negative alarm rate of about 2% that is a good 
 
 
indicator of the results. However, the main problem is the high 
rate of false positives in anomaly detection because of the 
different records that describe both normal and abnormal 
behavior. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Security and safety are a serious issue and a crucial requirement 
for self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles. The 
development of self-driving vehicles is in its initial phases and 
formal deployment of the technology is heavily dependent upon 
security and integrity of the systems involved. The detection of 
malicious vehicles in vehicular ad hoc networks can be 
achieved through the intelligent classification of messages and 
data being communicated. DoS attacks can have a direct impact 
on the life of passengers and on the vehicles themselves. This 
form of attack prevents the reception of CMA from vehicle to 
vehicle or infrastructure in that zone. In this case, IDS has 
become a very important solution to provide the required 
protection for VANETs. In our research, we have designed and 
implemented an intelligent detection system. The system has 
been designed for training and testing of two system scenarios 
that have been generated from the network. Our concept is to 
investigate the behavior of each vehicle in the network to 
determine if it is malicious or not. If a node drops all received 
data, this is identified as a vehicle that is malicious. The 
detection system should be capable of detecting both existing 
and new intruders who are related to packet drop. Although the 
error rate of our proposed system is 2.05%, still the IDS is 
effective and efficient in detecting anomaly and misuse with a 
high accuracy and a low false positive alarm rate. Our proposed 
work can be extended to use a fuzzy data set to reduce the rate 
of error and false positives incurred in the system. 
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